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YARDSTICK COMPETITION AND THE 
POLITICAL COSTS OF RAISING TAXES: 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF SPANISH MUNICIPALITIESa 
 
Núria Bosch, Albert Soléb 
 
 
ABSTRACT: We test the ‘yardstick competition’ hypothesis by looking at the effects of 
property tax increases both in the locality and in other comparable jurisdictions on the 
incumbents’ vote. In order to obtain unbiased estimates of the effects of taxes on voting, we 
account for national political shocks, ideological preferences of the citizenship and government 
traits, and we estimate the vote equation using instrumental variables. We also allow various 
traits of the government (ideology, coalition government, and first term government) to mediate 
the effects of taxes on voting. The vote equation was estimated using a large database 
containing nearly 3,000 Spanish municipalities and analysing three local elections (1995, 1999 
and 2003). The results suggest that property tax increases, both at municipality and 
neighbourhood level, have a non-negligible impact on incumbent votes, and that this impact is 
especially high when: the government is right-wing, is a coalition, and is not in its first term.  
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RESUMEN: Contrastamos la hipótesis de “competencia referencial” a través del examen de los 
efectos sobre los votos obtenidos por el partido en el gobierno de un aumento de los impuestos 
sobre la propiedad en una determinada localidad y en otras jurisdicciones comparables. A fin de 
poder obtener estimaciones insesgadas de esos efectos, tenemos en cuenta los shocks acaecidos 
en la política nacional, las preferencias ideológicas de los ciudadanos y las características del 
gobierno, y estimamos la ecuación de votación utilizando variables instrumentales. 
Consideramos, también, varias características del gobierno (ideología, gobierno de coalición y 
gobierno en su primer mandato) para mediar los efectos de los impuestos sobre el voto. La 
ecuación de votación fue estimada utilizando una base de datos de cerca de 3.000 municipios 
españoles y el análisis de tres elecciones locales (1995, 1999 y 2003). Los resultados sugieren 
que los incrementos en el impuesto sobre la propiedad, tanto a nivel del municipio como de 
aquellos circundantes, tienen un impacto nada despreciable sobre los votos obtenidos por el 
partido en el gobierno, y que tal impacto es especialmente elevado cuando el gobierno es de 
derechas, forma una coalición y no está en su primer mandato.  
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1. Introduction 
In many countries, taxes are a fundamental issue of the local political agenda. The high 
level of visibility of some local taxes1 mean that voters may be both aware of the money 
taken from their pockets by the local council and ready to vote against a tax increase 
(Stults and Winters, 2002). Tax increases, however, are often necessary to ensure the 
viability of public services, so it may not always be wise to vote against them. The 
fundamental problem here is one of asymmetric information, since it is difficult for 
voters to ascertain if the tax increase is justified or is the result of politicians’ profligacy. 
In this setting, theoretical papers have demonstrated the optimality of voting based on 
retrospective strategies, e.g. dismissing the incumbent if the tax increase exceeds a 
critical level (Ferejohn, 1986; Rogoff, 1990). This critical level must be chosen in order 
to put pressure on the incumbent without leading to too high a probability of dismissing 
“good” politicians. This means that even in this case, local politicians will be able to 
obtain some income at the expense of the voter.  
However, in a decentralised system, there are other possible (and more efficient) 
strategies for disciplining the incumbent. Voters might use other jurisdictions as a 
yardstick against to which evaluate the fiscal performance of their own government. They 
might consider that tax increases are necessary only if taxes also increase in comparable 
jurisdictions and, thus, punish incumbents that enact tax increases that are not in line with 
the increases passed in the neighbourhood. Yardstick competition was originally proposed 
by Shleifer (1985) as a way of improving the regulation schemes of franchise monopolies, 
and was first applied to the analysis of competition between sub-national governments by 
Salmon (1987). This author suggests that one of the main advantages of decentralisation 
is that it provides local governments with incentives to behave efficiently and to out-
perform governments in other jurisdictions. Besley and Case (1995) formalise this idea in 
a political agency model, finding that in the presence of asymmetric information on the 
cost of providing public services, voters can use information on tax increases in 
comparable jurisdictions when deciding whether or not to re-elect the incumbent 
                                                 
1 This is a trait often attributed to the property tax, which is the figure analysed in this paper. For example, it 
is often argued that the tax is highly visible, since “it is assessed on what is typically the household’s 
biggest consumption and investment item” (Wassmer, 1993). 
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government, and that incumbents are compelled to take into account this ‘comparative 
voting’ behaviour and to keep taxes in line with those in the neighbourhood2.  
The ‘yardstick competition’ theory provides therefore two different testable hypothesis. 
Firstly, the ‘comparative voting’ hypothesis states that a tax increase will have adverse 
electoral impacts only when it is not simultaneously accompanied by tax increases in 
neighbouring municipalities. Put another way, votes are reduced by a tax increase but 
increased by a similar increase in the neighbourhood. Secondly, the ‘tax-mimicking’ 
hypothesis states that incumbents will tend to mimic the tax decisions taken by 
governments of other jurisdictions considered comparable (Besley and Case, 1995). There 
are some papers in the literature that search for this mimicking behaviour by looking for 
spatial correlation between tax rates and/or tax changes in neighbouring jurisdictions 
(Besley and Case, 1995, Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998, Feld et al. 2001, Revelli, 2001; 
Bordignon et al., 2003 and 2004, and Solé-Ollé, 2003). However, the problem with this 
empirical approach is that it is very difficult to distinguish between the spatial tax 
interactions that arise because of ‘yardstick competition’ and those that arise because of 
‘tax competition’ for mobile resources (Brett and Pinske, 2000, Brueckner and Saavedra, 
2001, Buettner, 2001), since both hypotheses lead to the specification of a tax reaction 
function with a spatial lag parameter3.  
Nonetheless, there are only a few papers that attempt to directly test the ‘comparative 
voting’ hypothesis, by looking at the effects of neighbours’ tax increases on the electoral 
results. Besley and Case (1995) carry out this test with data from the US states, finding 
evidence of comparative voting behaviour. The same test is carried out by Revelli (2002) 
and Vermeier and Heyndels (2004), for UK and Flemish local governments, respectively, 
although with less conclusive results. In this paper, we follow the latter approach and 
estimate the effects tax increases both in the voters’ municipality of residence and in the 
neighbouring ones on the electoral results of the incumbent party (or parties). The test is 
carried out using data on nearly 3,000 Spanish municipalities for which we have 
                                                 
2 Extensions to this basic model include papers by Wrede (2001), Besley and Smart (2001), and Bordignon 
et al. (2003). 
 
3 Several authors try to untangle these two hypotheses by allowing the neighbours’ tax rates to interact with 
some political factors. They find, for example, that interactions are higher when electoral margins are low 
(Bordignon et al., 2003, and Solé-Ollé, 2003) or when governors are not in their last term of office (Besley 
and Case, 1995). 
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assembled detailed data on the property tax rate for the period 1990-2003, and data on the 
electoral results of three local elections (i.e., 1995, 1999 and 2003).  
In estimating the vote equation, we will use the recommendation of the extensive 
literature on estimation of popularity functions and economic voting (see Paldam, 1997, 
for example). We will control for the influence of underlying political factors such as 
national political shocks and the ideological bias of the voting population. We will also 
take into account the possible endogeneity of tax increases, estimating the vote equation 
using Instrumental Variables, and paying special attention to the reliability of the 
instruments used. Each of the papers mentioned above accounts for some of these aspects, 
but omits others. For example, although Besley and Case (1995) estimate the equation 
using Instrumental Variables, they do not include any control to account for the influence 
of national political shocks. The only paper that includes all of these steps is that by 
Revelli (2002) which finds that the results obtained depend to a great extent on these 
econometric considerations.  
It may in practice be very difficult to find instruments that are simultaneously valid and 
not weak. Although we have been able to find instruments that are reasonably strong, we 
will therefore also follow the suggestion of Stults and Winters (2002) which recommends 
allowing different traits of the government (in this case ideology, coalition government, 
and first-term government) to mediate the effects of tax increases on voting, both in the 
municipality and in the neighbourhood. These interaction effects may help to identify the 
effect of tax increases on vote results, given the problem of endogeneity mentioned 
above.These interaction effects are of course interesting in themselves, because they 
allow us to identify specific instances where a tax increase will cause significant electoral 
losses and, equally importantly, where the fiscal externality caused by a tax change in the 
neighbouring jurisdictions will have a stronger effect on the vote for the incumbent.  
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we describe how we test our 
hypothesis, beginning with a brief description of local taxation and politics in Spain, 
followed by a presentation of the vote equation, the econometric method and the database 
used. The results of the estimation of the vote equation are presented in section three. 
Finally, the fourth section offers a conclusion. 
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2. Empirical design 
In this section, we describe the empirical design we use in order to test the effect of 
property tax increases in both the municipality and the neighbourhood on the votes 
received by local governments in the election following the tax increase. The test will be 
performed with a large and unique database of nearly 3,000 Spanish municipalities with 
over 1,000 inhabitants during three electoral periods, delimited by the elections of 1991, 
1995, 1999 and 2003. This section is organised as follows. Firstly, in order to set the 
scene for the analysis and to provide some information that we consider important to 
understand some methodological decisions taken afterwards, we give a brief description 
of the Spanish local taxation and political system. Secondly, we present the specification 
used to test the hypothesis advanced above. Third, we describe the data base and the 
econometric techniques used.  
2.1 Local taxes and politics in Spain 
Local taxation. Spain consists of more than eight thousand municipalities, but most of 
these are quite small (i.e., 90% have less than five thousand inhabitants and represent no 
more than 5% of the Spanish population). These municipalities are multi-purpose 
governments, and their major expenditure categories are the traditional responsibilities 
assigned elsewhere to the local public sector (i.e., environmental services, urban planning, 
transportation, welfare, etc.) with the exception of education, a responsibility of regional 
governments in Spain. Municipal responsibilities grow steadily with population size, 
something that is duly recognised by the financing system. 
Own revenues account for more than 65% of municipal current revenues, with the 
remaining 35% being covered by grants, most of which are unconditional. Two thirds of 
the municipality’s own revenues come from five taxes and the remaining one-third from a 
variety of user charges. The main taxes are the property tax, the local business tax and the 
local motor vehicle tax, which respectively account for 50%, 20% and 15% of tax 
revenues4. The property tax is the only one that will be considered in the empirical 
analysis. There are two reasons for this decision. The first of these is that as it is the main 
local tax, it is also the focus of most of the taxpayer’s political discontent. Not only the 
yearly decision on the nominal tax rate, but also the less frequent decision to reassess the 
                                                 
4 The other two taxes are a tax on land value improvements and a tax on building activities. 
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property values of a municipality may entail significant political risks. The second reason 
is that we have been not able to include information on the business and vehicle tax rates 
in the huge database assembled for this paper. The main risk of this option is that the 
effect of the property tax rate may finally picks up the discontent of citizens with other 
taxes not included in our vote equation. We believe this risk is not very high given that 
the correlation among the tax increases of the three taxes does not seem to be very high5. 
In the early years of democracy, Spanish municipalities did not have any power to set 
property tax rates. However, at the end of the 1980s they were granted with the power to 
set the rates of the local taxes above a certain threshold, and above a completely 
harmonised tax base. There is a minimum nominal property tax rate of 0.4% of the 
assessed property value which is the same for all municipalities. This minimum tax rate is 
allowed to fall to 0.1% during the five years following a reassessment. The maximum 
nominal tax rate increases with population size, ranging from 0.85% for municipalities 
with less than 5,000 inhabitants to 1.1% for municipalities with more than 100,000 
inhabitants. Additional points may be applied if a municipality complies with some other 
conditions, including being a regional capital (+0.07%), having an urban transportation 
system (+0.07%), and providing more services than the ones defined as compulsory by 
law (+0.06%). As a result of the use of this tax autonomy, the disparities in property tax 
rates among municipalities are now considerable. Furthermore, the use of tax room is 
expected to continue in the future, since only a few municipalities have reached the top 
tax rate.  
The good health of the local property tax depends a great deal on the frequency and 
quality of property value reassessments. In Spain, an agency of the central government 
(‘Centro de Gestión Catastral y Cooperación Tributaria’) is responsible for doing this job. 
The reassessment system is thus the same throughout the country. However, a lack of 
resources and also political opposition often delay reassessment campaigns and, in 
practice, only a small fraction of municipalities are reassessed each year. Although the 
responsibility for the reassessment is a central one, in practice it is quite difficult to begin 
the process without the consent of the municipal government. In this sense, reassessments 
                                                 
5 In fact, we computed this correlation with the data available from only one Spanish region (the province of 
Barcelona, with data from the Diputación de Barcelona for various years) and the correlation between the 
increase in the property tax rate and the increase in business and vehicle tax rates was only 0.08 and 0.12, 
respectively. 
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are not truly exogenous. The average delay between two consecutive assessments can be 
substantial (e.g., 8 years in 1999; see Table 1). Because of this delay, a reassessment leads 
to a considerable jump in assessed values and although nominal tax rates are adjusted 
downwards, effective tax rates tend to increase by a considerable amount. This is the 
reason why political opposition to a property reassessment is usually quite high. Only 
strong governments or governments with financial problems are willing to take such a 
risk. 
Local politics. The local political system in Spain is similar to other systems operating in 
Europe (Colomer, 1995). Municipal elections are held simultaneously in all the 
municipalities at regular periods (every four years). Voters elect a given number of 
councillors that grows with the population of the municipality. These councillors in turn 
elect the mayor and he/she allocates the various local government posts among the 
councillors belonging to the party (or parties) that support him/her. During the period 
analysed, between 60 and 70% of the municipalities in the sample analysed were 
governed by majorities (see Table 1), while the remaining governments may be classified 
either as coalitions or as minority governments. Both coalitions and minority 
governments need to win the approval of more than one party in order to pass the budget 
(at the end of the previous year) and the fiscal ordinances setting the tax rates of the 
various local taxes and the sums of the local user charges (usually approved before the 
budget). Although failure to approve these documents does not lead to fresh elections 
(since these can be held only every four years), the budget process is determined by the 
possible break-up of the coalition government or by the formation of an alternative 
winning coalition by the parties in the opposition, in the case of a minority government. 
Although the power of the mayor regarding tax issues is therefore considerable, the fact 
that many governments are coalitions or minorities is a clear constraint on what he/she 
can do in that field, since the mayor can be dismissed by an alternative coalition at any 
time. There has been some concern in Spain regarding the instability of local coalition 
and minority governments, and the difficulty that they find in taking decisions regarding 
their budgets and other issues.  
In addition to the above, most of the candidates are aligned along national or regional 
party lines. In fact, the municipal political system is seen as a first step in the recruitment 
process of the regional and national political elite (Magre, 1998). In Spain, there are two 
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main national left-wing parties (PSOE (socialists), which formed the central government 
during the period 1983-96 and from 2004 to date and IU (former communists)) and one 
national right-wing party (PP, which formed the central government from 1996 to 2004). 
There are also many parties of a regional nature, some of which are on the left and some 
on the right but with nationalism or regionalism as a salient issue6. There are also many 
local parties or candidates running as independents, mostly in small municipalities. It is 
very difficult to ascertain the ideological position of these parties. 
2.2 The vote equation 
We wish to estimate the effects of taxes (both in the municipality and in the 
neighbourhood) on the votes obtained by the local government. It is not absolutely clear 
how to proceed in the specification of this equation in multi-party systems with many 
coalition governments. Most of the previous literature on the political costs of taxation 
comes from the U.S.7. Because the U.S. is a two-party system, the authors are able to use 
the vote share of one of the parties as a dependent variable, giving different responses to 
each of the explanatory variables if the party is the incumbent or the challenger (see, e.g., 
Peltzman, 1992, Lowry et al., 1998). This procedure will be difficult to apply in our case, 
given the high number of parties and the fact that in practice a party may play more than 
two roles8.  
In our case it therefore seems better to use the vote share of the parties in the governing 
council as the dependent variable. The few papers to analyse the effects of taxation on 
multiparty systems have followed this procedure (see for example Royed et al., 2000, 
Landon and Ryan, 1992, and Vermeier and Heyndels, 2004). However, we also use the 
vote share of the main party in the government in addition to this variable, which is the 
                                                 
6 The most relevant in terms of local governments controlled are CiU and ERC (right and left-wing, 
respectively, both in Catalonia), UV (right-wing, in Valencia), and BNG (left-wing, in Galicia), but there 
are one or two in each region. 
 
7 Early U.S. analyses include Pomper (1968 and 1976), Turett (1971) and Hansen (1983) and there are 
plenty more recent papers (Kone and Winters, 1983; Niemi et al., 1995; Brooks and Prysby, 1992; Besley 
and Case, 1995, and Lowry et al., 1998). There are a few papers on this outside the U.S.: in Canada 
(Landon and Ryan, 1997), in Belgium (Vermeier and Heyndels, 2004), and in the UK (Gibson, 1988; 
Gibson and Stuart, 1992; Rallings and Thrasher, 1997; Revelli, 2002). The studies of Belgium and the UK 
are especially interesting, because they are the only ones to refer to the local property tax which is the focus 
of the paper. 
 
8 For example, apart from  being incumbent or a challenger, a party may be a coalition partner or may not 
even stand in many municipalities. 
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mayor’s party in the vast majority of cases. Of course, these two equations are equivalent 
in the case of a majority government. However, they differ in the case of a coalition. In 
this case by estimating both the vote for the government and the vote for the party of the 
mayor, we are able to evaluate which member of the coalition –the main party or its 
partners – suffers most from tax increases9.  
Basic specification. With tiv ,  being the vote share of either the parties in the local 
government or the main party in municipality i just before election t, the equation we use 
in the analysis is:  
              
ti
p
trtititititi
tititi
fvzvyy
tv
,,,7,61,5,4,3
,2,1,
...∆W.∆.           
t∆W.∆.   
εααααα
αα
+++++++
+=
−
             (1) 
where tit ,∆  and tit ,∆W  are tax rate increases set by the municipality and by its 
neighbours during the four-year period before the election date t10. In this paper, we will 
limit our analysis to the effect of increases on the rate of the property tax, the main local 
tax in Spain. The term W is a weights matrix that identifies the pairs of municipalities that 
are considered neighbours. More details about the weighting scheme used are provided 
below. The terms tiy ,∆  and tiy ,∆W  are vectors of variables measuring the evolution of 
the local economy in the municipality and in the neighbourhood (e.g., growth in 
unemployment and population) during this four-year period. It is unclear that the voters 
hold local politicians accountable for the development of the economy, since given the 
small size of Spanish municipalities, their opportunities to improve the situation are 
limited. Nonetheless, it is also true that economic promotion (i.e., making efforts to bring 
economic activity to the locality) is a prominent issue on the local political agenda in 
Spain. We introduce measures of the neighbourhood’s economic situation in order to 
analyse the possibility of ‘comparative economic voting’.  
                                                 
9 See Anderson (1995 and 2000) and Wilkin et al. (1997) for analysis allowing for disaggregated 
government support for the party of the prime minister and its coalition partners. 
 
10 We have also estimated the equation allowing for different effects of tax increases enacted at diffe-rent 
points of the four-year period. We will comment on these results at the end of the next section. 
 
 10
The lagged vote share, 1, −tiv , is introduced to account for persistent shocks that may have 
an effect on the popularity of the government. Persistence in the vote share would suggest 
that once in power it becomes more difficult to lose the support gained from the public, 
thus giving an indication of some kind of ‘incumbency advantage’ (see for example, e.g., 
Lowry et al., 1998). We also include a vector of political characteristics in the equation, 
tiz , , which controls for the effects on the vote of having a coalition government or a 
government that is in its first term. The effect of these variables is unclear, but we may 
hypothesise, for example, that voters tend to punish coalitions for their incapacity to deal 
with problems quickly and efficiently. We may also expect that voters tend not to punish 
governments in their first term of office so severely, giving them confidence to develop 
the electoral program. This ‘honeymoon effect’ would disappear in subsequent terms of 
office (see, e.g., Veiga and Veiga, 2004)11. 
We include two additional controls in the equation to account for other unmeasured 
political factors. Firstly, we also include as a control variable the average vote share of the 
parties in the first three municipal elections held after the establishment of democracy 
(i.e., those of 1979, 1983 and 1987)12. This average vote share, iv , aims to capture the 
long-run idiosyncratic attachment of a municipality to a given party.  
Secondly, we include a set of regional election-party effects, ptrf , , which measure the 
popularity shocks experienced by the parties analysed at regional level. We deal with 
regional-election-party effects econometrically by including a dummy for each triplet of 
election, region and party. As explained in more detail in the next section, we will use 
both a complete list of parties and a smaller set of categories grouping the various parties 
according to ideology. The reason that led us to account for these popularity differences 
(across elections and municipalities and for the different parties) is that ideology is quite 
                                                 
11 It must be acknowledged that Veiga and Veiga (2004) have a much shorter period than four-years in mind 
when talking about this ‘honeymoon effect’. These authors are able to analyse the effects on the popularity 
of the government using survey data, so they have yearly data. We are only able to measure the popularity 
of the local government when an election is held, so the only thing we can do is try to differentiate between 
newly-elected and longer-established local governments. 
 
12 We will analyse the effects of tax increases on the results of the local elections of 1995, 1999 and 2003, 
using the lagged vote among the explanatory variables (i.e., that of the elections of 1999, 1995 and 1991, 
respectively) and the average vote share of the 1979, 1983 and 1987 elections. Note that the electoral results 
used to compute these two explanatory variables do not overlap. 
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important in Spanish local elections, and the main ways to identify ideological messages 
are the national party’s commitments. This means that many voters tend to vote for the 
same parties irrespective of the election (i.e., national or local) and that there is a kind of 
contagion across elections. Although we believe that local politics count, it is therefore 
also true that there is a positive connection between the popularity shocks suffered by a 
party at a national or regional level and its results at a local level. These shocks may be 
correlated with the general trends in taxation in localities governed by a given party and,  
the results of our analysis may therefore be biased if we do not control for these 
influences. In fact, results by Revelli (2002) for the UK reveal that the conclusions about 
the electoral costs of taxation may be altered when accounting for the influence of 
national politics13. 
Interactions. We then estimate whether the effects of tax increases (in the municipality 
and in the neighbourhood) on the electoral results depend on the political traits of the 
local government. In order to account for the effects of the political context on the 
electoral costs of raising taxes we estimate the following interaction equation: 
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              (2) 
where ti,RIGHT =1 if the parties in the local government have a right-wing ideology and 
0 in the case of left-wing parties, ti,COA = 1 if there is more than one party in the local 
government and 0 if there is only one party, and ti,NEW =1 if the government is in its 
first term of office and 0 if not. Note that the parameter 10α  measures the effect of 
increased property tax rates for the base category, i.e. for tax increased by a majority left-
wing government that is not in its first term of office.  
                                                 
13 Revelli (2002) controls for these time-invariant political preferences by including a set of municipal-party 
fixed effects. This procedure is not appropriate in our case since, given the reduced number of elections, it 
is evident that we can not include such a large number of dummies in the equation. Note also that these 
effects could not be eliminated by first-differentiation. This is due to the fact that the variable we are 
analysing is the vote share of the government parties, which need not be the same in two consecutive 
elections. The municipal-party effect in t and t-1 may therefore refer to different parties or coalitions of 
parties. Note that elimination of party-specific effects would be possible if our dependent variable was the 
vote share of one party (the same in all the elections analysed). 
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There are various reasons justifying interest in these interaction results. Firstly, these 
interaction effects may help also in the identification of the effect of tax increases on 
election results, given the possible endogeneity of the tax variables (more on this below). 
In fact, given the difficulty in finding suitable instruments for the tax increase, some 
authors propose correcting the problem by merely interacting the tax increase with 
political context dummies (see Stults and Whitten, 2003, for example). Since (as will 
become clear below) we have been able to find valid instruments for our tax variable, we 
do not rely exclusively on this procedure to identify the effects of taxes on the vote. 
Nevertheless, we consider that our results based on tax increase interactions improve 
confidence in the quality of the estimates. Secondly, these interaction effects may be 
interesting in themselves, because they allow us to identify specific instances where a tax 
increase will cause significant electoral losses14 and, equally importantly, where the fiscal 
externality caused by a tax change in neighbouring jurisdictions will have a stronger 
effect on the vote for the incumbent.  
The economic voting literature helps us to formulate some predictions regarding the sign 
of the coefficients in (2). In the case of ideology, some authors (Alesina and Rosenthal, 
1995) have argued that voters do not judge all parties equally, but instead have different 
expectations regarding what is a reasonable policy depending on the ideology of the 
party. This means that voters hold parties more responsible for their most salient goals, 
punishing the right more severely for tax increases. Lowry et al. (1998) show that this is 
indeed the behaviour of voters in US gubernatorial elections, where Republicans are 
penalised more severely for tax increases than Democrats15. Ideological differences 
between left and right-wing parties are more marked in Europe and Spain than in the US, 
even at a local level.We therefore expect that left-wing local governments will be 
punished less for the municipality’s tax increases than right-wing governments.  
However, this previous literature does not address the question of how ideology affects 
the yardstick effects. In fact, in the traditional analysis (Lowry et al., 1998) taxes are a 
                                                 
14 Recent research on the link between tax increases and elections indicates a variable impact depending on 
the type of tax raised and the political context surrounding a specific episode (Kone and Winters, 1983; 
Niemi et al., 1995; Brooks and Prysby, 1992; Besley and Case, 1995, and Lowry et al., 1998).  
 
15 Many papers in the empirical literature on economic voting have found that left-wing governments are 
more heavily penalised for unemployment increases while right-wing governments are more heavily 
penalised for inflation increases (see Powell and Whitten, 1993; Veiga and Veiga, 2004).  
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measure of government intervention, while in the yardstick model taxes (and the 
comparison of taxes with those in the neighbourhood) are a measure of politicians 
performance. Since it is not evident that left- or right- wing voters care differently about 
governments wasting money, neither is it evident whether yardstick effects should differ. 
From our point of view, the problem here is that both theoretical models deal with a 
relevant but partial portion of the reality, and that there is no attempt in the literature to 
develop a model capable of accounting for all these facts. Since this is not the purpose of 
our paper, we will simply give some intuition in order to suggest the possibility of 
differential yardstick effects regarding ideology. We begin by noting that the yardstick 
model (Besley and Case, 1995; Revelli, 2002) assumes that the level of local public goods 
is constant and that local spending only changes because of a cost shock or because of 
politicians’ profligacy. However, with ideological preferences, the level of spending may 
increase when a left party takes office because of a higher level of local public goods 
desired. If this is the case, it may be difficult for voters to judge the efficiency of the 
government by making tax comparisons and, therefore, both the municipality’s tax 
increases and tax increases in the neighbourhood may have a lower impact on the vote in 
the case of a left-wing government16. In the absence of a more detailed theoretical 
treatment of this hypothesis, it is difficult to say more about it. The empirical results will 
tell us if there is any basis for this intuition. 
The second hypothesis implicit in equation (2) is that voters react differently to tax 
increases enacted by coalitions. The so-called “clarity of responsibility” hypothesis states 
that the impact of economic variables on voting will be greater for governments with a 
greater clarity of responsibility (Powell and Whitten, 1993). Put another way, with a 
government with many different members, voters have many difficulties in ascertaining 
which of the parties is really responsible for the tax increase. Given this uncertainty, 
voters may decide not to punish any of these parties for the decisions taken. There is some 
empirical evidence for the validity of this hypothesis. For example, Powell and Whitten 
(1993) and Anderson (1995) have found evidence that coalition governments are 
punished less than majorities for unemployment and inflation. In the case of the US, 
                                                 
16 For example, imagine the discussion between the left-wing government and the right-wing opposition in 
the city council regarding the yearly tax increase. The opposition argues that the increase is excessive in the 
light of other tax increases in the neighbourhood, but the government answers that the comparison is not 
legitimate given that these increases are needed in order to finance a set of service improvements included 
in the electoral program. 
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Lowry et al. (1998) find that divided state governments face lower electoral costs of 
taxation than unified governments (i.e., when the same party controls both the executive 
and the legislative)17. We consider that in this case, there is no major problem in 
extending this hypothesis to the effect of neighbour’s tax increases. Voters may use 
relative tax increases in order to measure governments’ waste, but find it difficult to 
identify which party is responsible for this waste. 
The third hypothesis implicit in (2) is that voters seem to be less demanding of newly 
elected governments (i.e., governments that are in their first term) than of longer-
established governments. This could be termed a ‘honeymoon effect’ and may be 
explained by the fact that voters are willing to wait and see until the new government has 
implemented its program, i.e. there is some confidence that the tax increases enacted by a 
new government are justified by the need to apply a new policy. However, once this 
period elapses, this confidence erodes and voters are less willing to tolerate further tax 
increases. Although we have found no papers analysing the relationship between this 
‘honeymoon effect’ and the electoral costs of tax increases, there are some papers in the 
literature on economic voting that have documented its relevance (see Veiga and Veiga, 
2004, for example). We will account for this possibility and analyse whether vote losses 
caused by property tax increases are indeed lower during the first term of a local 
government. This hypothesis can also be extended to the impact of neighbours’ tax 
increases. The argument here is similar to that used in the case of ideology. Voters expect 
tax increases in the first term in order to finance the electoral program of the new 
government, and feel that it is not yet legitimate to make tax comparisons. Again, the 
empirical results will tell us if this intuition is justified by the facts or not. 
2.3 Data  
We estimate the vote equations using information from 2,799 Spanish municipalities for 
the period 1991-2003. We combine information on the electoral results of the municipal 
elections of 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2003 with property tax data and some socioeconomic 
variables for all the years of the period. In order to construct the average vote share for 
the parties in government, we also use information on the electoral results of the 1979, 
1983 and 1987 municipal elections. The property tax database includes all the Spanish 
                                                 
17 Despite this, some authors have questioned the validity of this hypothesis (Royed et al., 2000; Anderson, 
2000; Niemi et al., 2002).  
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municipalities, but for some of the elections, electoral information has only been provided 
for municipalities with more than 250 inhabitants, and some socio-economic data was 
available only for municipalities with more than 1,000 inhabitants. We also discarded 
some municipalities with a mayor belonging to a local party; because of the difficulty of 
assigning an ideological label to these parties. In the end, we were restricted to the 3,117 
municipalities with a population of over 1,000 inhabitants minus the ones with a mayor 
from a local party and minus some others with data problems, leaving us with the 2,799 
municipalities we used in the end. 
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Table 1: Definition of the variables, data sources, and descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition Data sources Descriptive statistics 
   Mean (Standard Dev.) 
   1991-95 1995-99 1999-03
e
tit 4,∆ −  ∆ Effective  Property tax rate  
(∆ in % of assessed 
property value)  
 
0.155 
(0.303) 
 
0.157 
(0.309) 
 
0.152 
(0.335) 
4,∆ −tih  % ∆ Urban units  per capita 
 
 
Property tax statistics, Centro 
de Gestión Catastral (Ministry 
of Finance) 7.624 
(16.309) 
6.362 
(11.601) 
3.289 
(9.661) 
4,∆ −tiu  % ∆ Unemployment  per capita 
National Institute of Statistics 
(INE) & Anuario Social de 
España (La Caixa) 
-5.81 
(9.52) 
-11.63 
(21.51) 
-14.71 
(25.60) 
4,∆ −tin  % ∆ Population National Institute of Statistics (INE) 
2.70 
(6.01) 
1.42 
(4.63) 
3.49 
(10.21) 
   Mean (Standard Dev.) 
   1991 1995 1999 
e
tit 4, −  Lagged Effective Property tax rate  
(% of assessed  
property value) 
 
0.523 
(0.170) 
 
0.678 
(0.265) 
 
0.835 
(0.275) 
n
ti
max
ti tt 4,4, −− −  
 
Lagged Difference 
between Nominal 
and Maximum Property 
tax rate 
 
0.391 
(0.256) 
 
0.378 
(0.274) 
 
0.365 
(0.286) 
4, −tia  Number of years from the last property value 
reassessment 
 
 
 
 
Property tax statistics,  
Centro de Gestión Catastral 
(Ministry of Finance) 
 
3.901 
(3.059) 
6.604 
(7.836) 
8.066 
(3.928) 
   Mean (Standard Dev.) 
   1995    
Election 
1999 
Election 
2003 
Election
 tiv ,  
Vote share,  
All parties 
56.74 
(11.41) 
59.13 
(12.96) 
58.20 
(12.16) 
 Vote share, 
Mayor’s  party 
49.73 
(13.22) 
49.11 
(13.11) 
49.19 
(14.46) 
 4, −tiv  
Lagged Vote share, 
 All parties 
59.82 
(13.51) 
60.92 
(15.52) 
60.24 
(15.00) 
 Lagged Vote share, 
Mayor’s  party 
52.00 
(14.21) 
50.42 
(12.96) 
49.88 
(0.146) 
 iv  Average Vote share,  
All parties 
52.12 
(11.65) 
52.12 
(11.65) 
52.12 
(11.65) 
 Average Vote share, 
Mayor’s  party 
 
 
 
 
Municipal Elections database, 
Ministry of Interior & Ministry 
of Public Administration 
46.02 
(12.01) 
46.02 
(12.01) 
46.02 
(12.01) 
   Mean  
   1991-95 1995-99 1999-03
COAi,t 1 if coalition 
government, 0 if not 
 
0.331 
 
0.385 
 
0.317 
RIGHTi,t 1 if government on the 
right 0 on the left  
 
0.348 
 
0.427 
 
0.481 
NEWi,t 1 if government in its 
first term, 0 otherwise 
 
Municipal Elections database, 
Ministry of Interior & Ministry 
of Public Administration 
 
0.398 
 
0.289 
 
0.269 
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The electoral database was compiled from two different files provided by the Spanish 
Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Public Administrations. The first provides 
information on the votes received by the various parties in the local elections. The second 
informs us of the number of councillors from each party and of which is the party of the 
mayor. In order to compute the vote share of the local government ( tiv , ) we simply add 
the votes of the different parties belonging to the local government during the previous 
four-year mandate and then divide by the number of valid votes. The lagged vote share 
( 1, −tiv ) is computed in a similar manner. Note that in any case, the parties used to 
compute both the vote share and the lagged vote share are the same -those belonging to 
the parties in the government during a given four-year mandate. The average vote share of 
a party or group of parties in charge during a given four-year mandate ( iv ) is computed 
with data on the vote share of these parties in the first three local elections held after the 
beginning of the democratic period (i.e., those of 1979, 1983 and 1987). 
The local government is considered a majority (MAJ) if the mayor’s party has more than 
the 50% of the councillors and otherwise as a coalition (COA). As far as ideology is 
concerned, there are several studies and surveys quantifying the ideological position 
attributed by Spaniards to the different parties (Sotillos, 1997; Molas and Bartomeus, 
1998). We used these ideological indexes to classify the parties into four groups: left, 
centre-left, centre-right and right. The regional-party-time dummies were devised using 
these four categories. For coalition governments, we computed an ideological index for 
the government as the summation of the ideological index of all the parties in the 
government weighted by the share of councillors of each of them. With this index, we 
were able to classify coalition governments in the four categories mentioned above. The 
interactions with tax increases only include two variables, LEFT and RIGHT, the first one 
containing governments in the first two categories and the second one the other two. 
Finally, a local government is classified as being in its first term of office (NEW) if the 
party of the mayor has changed between one four-year period and the following one. 
Table 1 provides information on the proportions of local governments in each category. 
The property tax database comes from the Ministry of Finance and has been provided by 
the central government agency responsible for carrying out property value assessments in 
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all the Spanish municipalities (the “Centro de Gestión Catastral y Cooperación 
Tributaria”). This database includes information on each Spanish municipality for the 
nominal property tax rate, assessed property value, number of homes, and year of the last 
property value reassessment. We used this information to compute the increase in the 
effective property tax rate, etit 4,∆ − , in each of the three four-year periods analysed18: 
                                 )/∆(∆∆ 1,,,4,4,4, −−−− ××+= ririnritintieti tdrevtt υυ                                  (3) 
where ntit 4,∆ −  is the increase in the nominal property tax rate during the four-year period 
preceding the election, 4, −tidrev  is a dummy equal to one if there was a property value 
reassessment during this four-year period, nrit ,  is the nominal property tax rate the year 
before the implementation of the new assessed values, and 1,, /∆ −riri υυ is the increase in 
assessed values due to the reassessment process compared to the assessed property values 
just before this new reassessment19. If there is no reassessment during a given four-year 
mandate, the increase in the effective property tax rate therefore equals the increase in the 
nominal tax rate )∆∆ (i.e., 4,4,
n
ti
e
ti tt −− = , but if there is a reassessment, it is necessary to 
compute the increase in the effective property tax rate in the way suggested by expression 
(3).  
We include two variables as economic controls ( tiy ,∆ ) in the vote equations: the rate of 
increase in per capita unemployment in the municipality ( tiu ,∆ ) and the rate of increase 
in the population ( tin ,∆ ). The first variable is frequently used in the literature of 
economic voting. We think this second variable may also measure the economic success 
of the municipality. Although we accept that population increases also impose costs on 
residents, Spanish mayors seem to feel that they tend to bring more benefits, to the 
                                                 
18 It is not clear which is the most appropriate timing of taxation to consider. In fact, one can argue that 
voters are myopic and do not consider all the tax increases occurring during the four-year term, but only 
those occurring soon before elections. In the next section we also comment on the further results obtained 
when considering the tax increases occurring in the first and second half of the four-year term of office 
separately. 
 
19 Note that the term )/∆( 1,,, −× ririnrit υυ  could be interpreted as the change in the nominal property tax 
rate that is required in order to neutralise the increase in assessed property values and to prevent the average 
tax liability from increasing. 
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citizens or to themselves20. Given that it seems appropriate to account for economic 
voting in relative terms, we also include the unemployment and population increases in 
the neighbourhood ( tiu ,∆W  and tin ,∆W ) in the vote equation. 
Tax rate increases in the neighbourhood are computed with the help of the weights’ 
matrix W. This is a N×N matrix, where N = the number of municipalities, with zeros in 
the diagonal and with elements wij different from zero if the two municipalities i and j can 
be considered neighbours. Note that it is not possible to identify these neighbourhood 
effects by estimating tax interactions for each pair of municipalities21. Therefore, an ‘a 
priori’ set of interactions has to be defined and tested instead, as is well established in the 
“spatial econometrics” literature (see Anselin, 1988). A common procedure for specifying 
these interactions uses geographic proximity criteria. There is a theoretical justification 
for using geographical weights if voters are more able to get information on tax rates in 
the neighbourhood than in farther places. There are several reasons that lead us believe 
that this assumption is appropriate in our case. Firstly, local tax decisions are normally 
covered by the local press, reaching specific sub-regions. Secondly, voters are able to get 
information from the jurisdictions where they work, shop or where their relatives and 
friends live, and these jurisdictions are usually in the nearby neighbourhood, at least in 
Spain. Thirdly voters may get comparative information from local opposition parties; 
these local politicians usually interact more with local politicians in the same region, than 
with more distant ones22. As a result, in this paper we will use a definition of 
neighbourhood based on pure proximity, with neighbours being defined as municipalities 
located within a distance of 20 km23.The weights used are therefore 1/ni if there is a 
                                                 
20 As explained above, Spanish municipalities receive more responsibilities, more tax autonomy and higher 
transfers as their population increases. The enhanced role of larger municipalities is also usually recognised 
informally by the political market, by enhancing the career prospects of local politicians. 
 
21 This will force us to estimate 2,799 × 2,799 parameters, something not possible with 2,799 × 3 
observations.  
 
22 For example, a higher tier of local government covering specific sub-regions, issues yearly surveys of 
budgetary and fiscal data, comparing the situation of each municipality with other municipalities in the 
same area (see, Diputación de Barcelona, various years, for an example). It is more difficult to obtain 
comparative fiscal information for all the Spanish territory; in fact, this is one of the first papers to use a 
database of local tax rates covering all Spain. 
 
23 This same criterion was used in the tax mimicking analysis in Solé-Ollé (2003). We also tried other 
criteria, changing the distance to 10 km, 30km and 40km, and using inverse distance weights with various 
distance exponents (0.5, 1, 1.5 and 2), but the best fit was obtained with the 20km threshold. These results 
are available upon request. 
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distance of less than 20km between two municipalities and 0 otherwise, where ni = the 
number of neighbours of municipality i. Note that this procedure is equivalent to 
computing the neighbours’ tax increase as a weighted average of the tax rate increases of 
all the municipalities defined as ‘neighbours’. 
2.4 Econometrics  
Endogeneity. The first econometric problem we found, which is widely mentioned in the 
literature on the estimation of popularity functions (see for example Paldam, 1997, Stults 
and Winters, 2002) and also in some papers testing the comparative voting hypothesis 
(Revelli, 2002), consists of the finding that the tax increase in equation (2) can not be 
assumed to be strictly exogenous. The reason for the endogeneity is that there may be 
shocks to the local government’s popularity (included in the error term ti,ε ) that are 
correlated with the tax increase. For example, consider a local government seeking re-
election at a time of low popularity that decides to recover the support of the citizens by 
cutting the local tax rate. On the other hand, consider the situation of a very confident 
local government (either because the citizens of this municipality have a very marked 
preference for the ideology of this party or because the party has suffered a huge positive 
popularity shock at regional or national levels). This government team can raise the local 
tax and still expect to be re-elected. In previous papers, Solé-Ollé (2003 and 2005) 
explicitly acknowledge that incumbent Spanish governments differentiate their fiscal 
policies according to their perceived popularity, measured by the margin of victory 
obtained in the previous election. In this paper, we do not attempt to estimate a 
comprehensive political-economy model that includes both a vote equation and a tax 
setting reaction equation, but instead follow the procedure used by Revelli (2002) and 
adopt an Instrumental Variables approach in order to solve the tax increase endogeneity in 
the vote equation. 
We found some difficulties in obtaining valid instruments for the tax rate increase, 
although this is a general problem in this kind of studies (see Stults and Winters, 2002). 
Note that some of the variables that may help to explain effective property tax rate 
increases are already included in the vote equation. For example, we could have tried to 
use the margin of victory in the previous election, but this variable is very much the same 
(at least in our sample) as the previous vote share (included in the equation) and is, 
therefore, inappropriate as an instrument. It should also be noted that the financial 
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variables that seem to be exogenous determinants of local tax rates in the Spanish case 
(e.g., intergovernmental transfers, see Solé-Ollé, 2003) are not included in our database. 
Moreover, some of the variables present in our database are correlated with the residuals 
and are not valid instruments. This is the case of the a dummy indicating if a property 
value reassessment took place during the four-year term, the number of years since the 
last property reassessment at the beginning of the term, and the growth in assessed value 
per capita during the four-year term. In none of these cases did the Sargan test (Sargan, 
1958) allow us to accept the validity of these variables as instruments. There are some 
explanations for the failure of these variables as instruments. Firstly, these results clearly 
suggest that although they are carried out by a central government agency, property value 
reassessments are endogenous, in the sense that only when a local government feels 
politically safe is it able to accept the risk of such a process (which usually entails 
increases in tax liabilities). Secondly, the rise in assessed values per capita is also 
endogenous, because these values tend to rise because of property value reassessments. 
Thirdly, the number of years since the last reassessment (and number of years squared) is 
also a determinant of the probability of carrying out a reassessment. Although this 
variable seems in principle to be exogenous, one would think that if the reassessment has 
not been carried out previously, it is because the local government is especially 
vulnerable to popularity shocks. 
The only valid instruments we have been able to find are: the increase in the number of 
homes per capita during the four-year term, the lagged effective property tax rate (i.e., the 
effective tax rate in the previous election year), the distance between the nominal tax rate 
and the maximum nominal tax rate allowed by law, and this variable squared24.  
There are various stories that may be invoked to justify the use of these variables as 
instruments. The increase in the number of homes per capita leads to an increase in the 
property tax base that may help to reduce the effective property tax rate. The effective 
property tax rate increase may rise as its lagged value falls if local governments gradually 
                                                 
24 The lagged effective tax rate was computed by adding the increases in the effective property tax rate that 
occurred in the following periods to the 1990 nominal tax rate. The lagged effective tax rate and the 
‘distance between nominal and maximum nominal tax rates’ are only slightly correlated (with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.256). There are two reasons for this result. Firstly, maximum nominal tax rates are not the 
same for all the municipalities, but grow with population size, and secondly, when a reassessment is carried 
out effective tax rates tend to peak and, at the same time, nominal tax rates decrease in order to avoid 
excessive increases in tax liabilities. These two effects compensate for the obvious increase in the effective 
tax rate that occurs when a municipality decides to rise the nominal tax rate. 
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adjust the levels of taxation to their desired levels. The relationship between the effective 
property tax rate increase and the distance between the nominal tax rate and the maximum 
nominal tax rate allowed by law may be explained by two different effects. On the one 
hand, if property value reassessments are not carried out, local governments are forced to 
use the nominal tax rate in order to increase tax liabilities. However, as nominal tax rates 
are increased year after year, they approach the maximum nominal tax rate allowed, 
reducing the margin for continuing with these increases in the future. We therefore expect 
that as the distance between the nominal tax rate and the maximum tax rate diminishes, 
the local government will pass lower nominal tax increases and, in the absence of a 
property value reassessment process, these will automatically lead to effective tax 
increases. On the other hand, the erosion of the margin for increasing the nominal tax rate 
may force the local government to engage in a property value reassessment process, and it 
is an empirical regularity that effective property tax rates tend to rise after such a 
process25. Since the two effects have different signs, the relationship between the distance 
between nominal and maximum tax rate and the increase in the effective tax rate may 
well be non-linear.We will therefore use both the distance and the distance squared as 
instruments. 
These instruments meet the two conditions that should be demanded of a good instrument 
- orthogonality with the residuals and correlation with the effective property tax rate 
increase. Table 1 shows several attempts at estimating the first-stage regressions, 
including both the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ instruments. Column 1 uses the following as 
instruments: the lagged effective tax rate ( etit 4, − ), the increase in the number of homes 
( 4,∆ −tih ), the distance between the nominal and the maximum tax rate ( ntimaxti tt 4,4, −− − ), and 
the number of years since the last reassessment ( 4, −tia ). Column 2 adds the square of 
these last two variables. Note that the explanatory capacity of these first-stage regressions 
is substantial, which follows the rule of thumb suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) that 
first-stage F-statistics should be higher than ten, and that explanatory capacity improves 
                                                 
25 There are various possible explanations for this increase. Firstly, there is the fact that in Spain, in addition 
to maximum nominal tax rates, there are also minimum nominal tax rates. It is true that the minimum tax 
rate is allowed to fall after a property value reassessment, but it is also true that these minimum tax rates 
must be raised again five years after the reassessment. Secondly, it may be politically advantageous to 
increase the effective property tax rate after a property value reassessment, although it is not entirely 
whether  this political advantage arises entirely from rational behaviour (as Strumpf, 2002, suggests) or is 
due to voters’ fiscal illusion (Bloom and Ladd, 1982; Ladd, 1991).  
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when the squared terms are added. However, the value of the Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions is very high. We are not able to reject the null of correlation 
between the instruments and the error term and we have to conclude that some of these 
instruments are not valid. Columns 3 and 4 repeat the estimation by excluding the ‘years 
since reassessment’ and the ‘homes per capita’ variables, respectively. When excluding 
the ‘years since reassessment’ variable the value of the Sargan test drops abruptly, so we 
can now accept that the instruments are correct at conventional significance levels. When 
excluding the variable ‘homes per capita’ (column 4), we still have problems with the 
instruments. Finally, if we exclude both variables (column 5) the remaining instruments 
appear to be valid but the explanatory capacity of the model drops a little. Given that all 
the instruments of column 3 seem to be valid26, we decided to use column 3 as our first-
stage regression for the IV estimation of the vote equation27.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 One may have a prior suspicion about the validity of the ‘homes per capita’ instrument. In order to test 
for this possibility, we use a ‘difference-in-Sargan’ statistic (Hayashi, 2000), computed as the difference of 
the Sargan statistics of columns 5 and 3 of Table 1 (excluding and including this instrument). This test is 
distributed as a χ2(K) with K = loss of over-identifying restrictions. The value of the test is in this case 
2.562, which is clearly lower than a χ2(1) at conventional significance levels. We therefore have to accept 
the validity of the ‘homes per capita’ variable as an instrument. 
 
27 In Table 2, we have not presented the results obtained when using the reassessment dummy, but the 
results obtained for this variable indicate that, although its explanatory capacity is substantial, it is clearly 
correlated with the error term. 
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Table 2: Instrumental variables estimation: first-stage regression.  
Dependent variable: ‘effective’ property tax increases ( etit 4,∆ − ) 
No. obs.= 9.397 (N = 2.799, T=3: 1995, 1999 & 2003 Elections)   
Variable (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) OLS (5) OLS 
e
tit 4, −  -0.034 (-5.091)*** 
-0.056 
(-7.089) *** 
-0.051 
(-2.601)*** 
-0.041 
(-6.435)*** 
-0.048 
(-2.378)*** 
n
ti
max
ti tt 4,4, −− −  0.096 (2.578)** 
-0.734 
(-2.746) *** 
-0.893 
(-3.379)*** 
-0.761 
(-2.832)* 
-0.878 
(-3.687)*** 
( )24,4, ntimaxti tt −− −  --.-- 0.985 (3.799)*** 0.810 (3.286)*** 0.965 (3.845)*** 0.977 (3.319)*** 
 4, −tia  
0.010 
(6.350)*** 
0.049 
(9.796)*** 
--.-- 0.055 
(11.150)*** 
--.-- 
 2 4, −tia  (×102) --.-- -0.056 (-10.994)***
--.-- -0.057 
(-11.326)*** 
--.-- 
 4∆ -ti,h  -0.098 
(-2.177)*** 
-0.125 
(-3.281)*** 
-0.144 
(-5.657)*** 
--.-- --.-- 
 Adjusted R2 0.107 0.147 0.110 0.135 0.087 
 F-statistic (All instruments) 44.818*** 59.181*** 46.106*** 55.436*** 37.211*** 
 F-statistic (Excluded variables) 18.605*** 30.535*** 15.266*** 27.192*** 7.291*** 
 Sargan (Instrument validity) 15.663 
[0.000] 
24.351 
[0.000] 
7.315 
[0.071] 
26.031 
[0.000] 
4.870 
[0.093] 
Notes: (1) t statistics are shown in brackets; *, ** & *** significantly different from zero at the 
90%, 95% and 99% levels. (2) Sargan test for instrument validity, distributed as a χ2(K) with K = 
number of over-identifying restrictions (p-value in brackets). 
 
Spatially correlated shocks. The other econometric challenge is caused by the fact that 
the presence of the neighbour’s tax increases in the right hand of the vote equation may 
introduce a bias if the shock to popularity ( ti,ε ) is itself spatially correlated. Let us 
suppose, for instance, that ti,ε  follows a first order spatial auto-correlation process: 
                                                      tititi ,,, ξεW.ρε +=                                                       (4) 
This pattern may be caused, for example, by the omission of relevant economic and 
political controls that show a spatial pattern from the vote equation. Let us consider, for 
example, a region hit by a recession (not well controlled by the variables included in the 
equation) which hurts all the governments. In this case, the OLS coefficient of 
neighbours’ tax increase may be picking not only the ‘comparative voting’ effects but 
also the effects of these omitted variables. A common procedure for solving this problem 
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is to instrument the neighbour’s tax increases (see Revelli, 2002).  The available 
instruments are the same as for the own tax increases: the neighbour’s lagged effective 
tax rate, the neighbour’s distance between nominal and maximum tax rates, and the 
neighbour’s ‘homes per capita’. However, in our case, it will not be necessary to 
instrument this variable. We reached this conclusion after performing two tests. First, we 
tested for spatial auto-correlation in the error term of the vote equation using the Moran’s 
I test (Moran, 1948). The test was also computed with the standardised 20km weights 
matrix introduced above. In no case can the null hypothesis of an absence of spatial auto-
correlation be rejected. We also performed a Hausman endogeneity test (Hausman, 1978), 
by comparing the coefficient vector obtained by instrumenting only the municipality’s tax 
increase and that obtained when also instrumenting the neighbours’ tax rates28. The value 
of the test is very low, due to the fact that the coefficient estimates are similar in both 
cases, and we have to conclude that the neighbours’ tax increases can be considered 
exogenous. 
 
3. Results 
The parameter estimates of the basic vote equation (2) are shown in Table 3. Table 4 
shows the results of the estimation of vote equation that includes the interactions of tax 
increases with the government type dummies. In both tables, the dependent variable is the 
vote share of all the parties in the local government team29. In all the cases the 
explanatory capacity of the model is quite good.  
Basic results. As can be seen in the first column of Table 3, the coefficient of the 
municipality’s tax increase variable is not statistically significant when the equation is 
estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Note that although the sign of the coefficient 
was what expected, its value is quite low. Nevertheless, the coefficient of the neighbours’ 
                                                 
28 Hausman-Wu tests compare the coefficients of an efficient estimator (usually OLS) and an inefficient but 
consistent estimator (IV). The test statistic is distributed as an χ2(K) with K = number of regressors being 
tested for endogeneity. The test can also be used to test for the endogeneity of a subset of regressors (in our 
case, the neighbours’ tax rates). The test is performed as before, as the difference between the two vectors 
of coefficients. In this case, however, the fully efficient estimator is the one that treats the municipality’s tax 
increases as endogenous but the neighbours’ tax increases as exogenous, and the inefficient but consistent 
estimator is the one that treats both variables as exogenous. 
 
29 The results were replicated with the vote share of the party of the mayor as the dependent variable. We 
will comment on these additional results at the end of this section. 
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tax increase is positive and statistically significant at the 95% level. These results suggest 
that the equation might need to be estimated by Instrumental Variables (IV). The results 
of the IV estimation are shown in the second and third columns of Table 2. In the second 
column, only the municipality’s own tax increase has been instrumented, while in the 
third the neighbours’ tax increase has also been instrumented. The results of the Moran’s 
I statistic allow us to reject the presence of spatial auto-correlation in the error term, and 
the Hausman test suggests that the neighbours’ tax increase variable is not correlated with 
the error term. This suggests that it is not necessary to instrument this variable and that we 
can concentrate on the results of column 2. As we mentioned in the previous section, we 
experimented with many instruments for the municipality’s tax increase, but only a subset 
of them could be considered exogenous. We present the results when using all the 
appropriate instruments simultaneously (i.e., growth in number of homes per capita, 
lagged effective tax rate, and distance between nominal and maximum tax rates, and this 
variable squared). The results of Table 2 showed that these variables explain a substantial 
portion of the changes in effective property tax rates. Since some of our instruments are 
constructed with lagged variables, it seems necessary to test for serial correlation in the 
residuals of the vote equation. The Arellano and Bond (1991) AR(1) test (at the bottom of 
the table) indicates that there is no serial correlation, which confirms the reliability of our 
instruments. 
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Table 3: Effects of property tax increases  on the vote share (vi,t,) of Spanish local  
governments. Basic results. No. obs.= 9.397 (N = 2.799, T=3: 1995, 1999 & 2003 Elections)   
Variable (1) OLS (2) IV (3) IV (4) IV (5) IV (6) IV
i.- Property tax rates 
e
tit 4,∆ −  -0.034 (-0.522) 
-0.084 
(-4.697) *** 
-0.078 
(-5.741)*** 
-0.028 
(-0.604) 
-0.016 
(-0.874) 
-0.085 
(-4.784)***
e
tit 4,∆W −  0.061 (2.101)** 
0.062 
(3.308)*** 
0.059 
(2.974)*** 
0.044 
(1.602) 
0.052 
(3.643)*** 
0.063 
(3.422)*** 
ii.- Controls: economic 
 4,∆ −tiu  
-0.023 
(-0.404) 
-0.026 
(-0.310) 
-0.022 
(-0.651) 
-0.011 
(-0.152) 
-0.030 
(-1.584) 
--.-- 
 4,∆W −tiu  
0.069 
(2.462)** 
0.073 
(2.600)*** 
0.070 
(2.541)*** 
-0.007 
(-0.001) 
-0.022 
(-1.054) 
--.-- 
 4,∆ −tin  
0.043 
(1.422) 
0.043 
(1.569) 
0.044 
(1.350) 
0.040 
(0.645) 
0.054 
(1.554) 
--.-- 
 4,∆W −tin  
-0.016 
(-1.369) 
-0.026 
(-1.236) 
-0.031 
(-0.874) 
-0.133 
(-0.841) 
-0.021 
(-1.210) 
--.-- 
iii.- Controls: political
 4, −tiv  
0.663 
(15.820)***
0.666 
(15.872)*** 
0.687 
(14.981)***
0.682 
(16.572)*** 
--.-- 0.665 
(15.863)***
 iv   0.186 (5.700)*** 
0.185 
(5.667)*** 
0.180 
(5.741)*** 
0.187 
(6.082)*** 
--.-- 0.186 
(5.720)*** 
 COAi,t -0.045 
(-7.061)** 
-0.048 
(-7.344)** 
-0.038 
(-8.647)*** 
-0.047 
(-7.215)*** 
--.-- -0.046 
(-7.100)***
 NEW i, 0.032 
(7.062)***
0.046 
(4.548)***
0.051 
(2.674)***
0.039 
(3.966)*** 
--.-- 0.045 
(4.486)***
 Party×Region×Time effects YES YES YES NO YES YES 
 Adjusted R2 0.774 0.775 0.754 0.152 0.172 0.057 
 Breusch-Pagan  (Heterosk.) 0.889 1.221 0.868 0.968 0.667 0.578 
 Sargan (Instrument validity) --.-- 4.870 
[0.093] 
10.521 
[0.072] 
4.741 
[0.097] 
6.210 
[0.043] 
5.110 
[0.068] 
 Hausman (Endogeneity) --.-- --.-- 0.213 
[0.000] 
--.-- --.-- --.-- 
 Moran’s I (Spatial error corr.) 0.125 0.098 0.101 0.114 0.014 1.221 
 AR (1)  (Serial error corr.) 0.541 0.301 0.156 0.621 0.504 0.741 
 Wald (Economic controls) 7.25 7.33 7.54 5.69 3.98 --.-- 
 Wald (Political controls) 90.66*** 47.65*** 51.36*** 42.51*** --.-- 56.14*** 
 Wald (Party × Region ×Time) 902.38*** 921.12*** 900.54*** --.-- 914.51*** 936.47*** 
Notes: (1) t statistics are show in brackets; *, ** & *** significantly different from zero at the 90%, 95% 
and 99% levels. (2)IV = instrumental variables estimation. (3) Breusch-Pagan test for the presence of 
heteroskedasticity. (4) Sargan test for instrument validity, distributed as a χ2(K) with K = number of over-
identifying restrictions (p-value in brackets); instruments used: increase in homes per capita, lagged 
effective tax rate, lagged distance to top allowed tax rates, and this last variable squared. (5) Moran’s I 
test for spatial error correlation, distributed as a N(0,1).  (6) Hausman (1978) test of endogeneity of 
neighbour’s tax increase, distributed as a χ2(1) (p-value in brackets). (7) Arellano and Bond (1991) panel 
AR(1) test. (8) Wald test of the joint significance of different groups of variables. 
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The results of the IV estimation confirm that the municipality’s own tax increases have an 
adverse impact on the vote share. An increase of 1 point in the property tax rate (i.e., an 
additional 1% on the assessed property value) reduces the vote share of the parties in the 
local government by a 8.4%. This is not a very large impact, but neither is it negligible. 
From Table 1, we can see that the average tax increase during one four-year period is 
approximately 0.15%. This means that the government of the average municipality loses 
1.26% of its vote because of tax increases. The results regarding the neighbours’ tax 
increases mirror those of the municipality’s own tax increases. The sign in this case is 
always positive and the coefficient is statistically significant. The magnitude of the 
coefficient is only slightly lower (in absolute value) than that of the municipality’s own 
tax increase. What therefore really has an impact on the vote for the government is a 
‘relative’ property tax increase. If a local government enacts a property tax increase of a 
similar magnitude to the one enacted by other governments, the vote loss need not be very 
high. The ‘comparative voting’ hypothesis is therefore confirmed by our results.  
The results shown in Table 3 regarding the control variables also merit some comments. 
Firstly, the economic controls have the expected sign (i.e., increases in unemployment 
relative to the neighbourhood are punished, while increases in the relative population size 
are rewarded), although the coefficients are not generally statistically significant. 
Secondly, the coefficient of the lagged vote share is positive and significant, indicating 
the persistence of popularity shocks or ‘incumbency advantage’. Thirdly, the average vote 
share is also positive and highly significant. Moreover, the coefficient of this variable is 
quite high, suggesting a high degree of voter preseverance with the different ideological 
options. Fourthly, the coalition dummy (COA) is statistically significant and the 
coefficient is negative, meaning that –other things being equal–  coalitions are punished 
in elections, obtaining a vote share that is 3-4% lower. This means that voters find that 
some traits of coalition governments are unattractive (e.g. problems requiring collective 
action). Fifthly, the first term dummy is also statistically significant and its effect is 
positive. This means that voters give some confidence to first term governments, which 
have a 3-5% bonus compared to older governments. Sixthly, the Party × Region × Time 
effects are statistically significant (see the Wald test at the bottom of the table). This 
should be interpreted as evidence of the influence of national politics on municipal 
elections. When a party suffers a popularity shock at national or regional level, its vote 
share in a given municipality is also reduced. These results are consistent with those 
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obtained by Revelli (2002) for the UK. In our case, however, the relevance of national 
politics does not prevent local tax increases also having some impact on the voting 
results. In fact, controlling for national political influences (and for other political factors) 
becomes essential in order to insure that the estimated coefficients for the tax increase 
variables are unbiased. In Columns 4, 5 and 6 of Table 3, we check whether or not the 
significant effect of tax increases on the vote are conditioned by the inclusion in the 
equation of the different control variables. Column 4 excludes the Party × Region × Time 
effects, column 5 excludes the other political control variables, and column 6 excludes the 
economic controls. In our case, the statistically significant effect is guaranteed only when 
the political control variables are included. These results are virtually unaffected by the 
economic control variables. 
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Table 4:  Effects of property tax increases  on the vote share (vi,t,) of Spanish local Governments.  
Political interactions. No. obs.= 9.397 (N = 2.799, T=3: 1995, 1999 & 2003 Elections)   
Variable (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) IV (5) IV (6) IV 
 etit 4,∆ −  -0.025 (-0.569)  
-0.015 
(-0.367) 
-0.018 
(-0.621) 
-0.062 
(-2.359) ***
-0.043 
(-2.256)** 
-0.044 
(-2.365)** 
 etit 4,∆W −  0.017 (2.158)** 
0.014 
(2.236)** 
0.016 
(2.320)** 
0.042 
(3.701)*** 
0.037 
(2.320)** 
0.038 
(2.021)** 
 etit 4,∆ − × RIGHTi,t -0.042 (-2.013)** 
-0.047 
(-1.985)** 
-0.038 
(-2.001)** 
-0.072 
(-3.562)*** 
-0.051 
(-3.025)*** 
-0.056 
(-2.754)*** 
 etit 4,∆W − × RIGHTi,t 0.026 (2.641)*** 
0.023 
(2.263)*** 
0.024 
(2.206)*** 
0.055 
(3.001)*** 
0.047 
(2.305)*** 
0.044 
(2.884)*** 
 etit 4,∆ − × COAi,t --.-- -0.015 (-1.786)* 
-0.018 
(-1.696)* 
--.-- -0.067 
(-4.125)*** 
-0.045 
(-3.021)*** 
 etit 4,∆W − × COAi,t --.-- 0.039 (3.559)*** 
0.041 
(3.101)*** 
--.-- 0.040 
(3.965)*** 
0.034 
(3.364)*** 
 etit 4,∆ − × NEWi,t --.-- --.-- 0.008 (1.362) 
--.-- --.-- 0.012 
(1.745)* 
 etit 4,∆W − × NEWi,t --.-- --.-- -0.009 (-1.446) 
--.-- --.-- -0.014 
(-1.320) 
Economic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Political controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Party × Region × Time effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Adjusted R2 0.712 0.735 0.728 0.732 0.741 0.735 
 Breusch-Pagan (Heterosk.) 0.885 0.956 0.960 0.985 1.335 1.241 
 Sargan (Instrument validity) --.-- --.-- --.-- 7.804 
[0.095] 
7.594 
[0.013] 
7.822 
[0.091] 
 Moran’s I (Spatial error corr.) 0.226 0.125 0.326 0.185 0.109 0.952 
 AR (1)  (Serial error corr.) 0.741 0.446 0.269 0.774 0.553 0.651 
 Wald (Economic controls) 5.46 7.99 7.21 5.24 7.85 8.00 
 Wald (Political controls) 91.10*** 93.00*** 59.10*** 91.21*** 92.33*** 58.01*** 
 Wald (Party × Region ×Time) 914.10*** 977.62*** 1,022.06*** 921.56*** 998.21*** 1,014.15*** 
Notes: See Table 3. 
 
Interactions. The results allowing for differential effects of tax increases according to 
political traits of local governments are shown in Table 4. The first three columns show 
the OLS results and the last three the IV results. The first and the fourth columns show 
how the effect on the vote share depends on ideology. The coefficient of the tax increase 
variable (without interaction) shows the result for the base category (LEFT). In order to 
ascertain the impact of a tax increase in the case of a right-wing government, this 
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coefficient must be added to the one for the tax increase interacted with the RIGHT 
dummy. The OLS results of column 1 show a negative but not significant effect of the 
municipality’s own tax increases for the base category, but a negative and statistically 
significant effect in the case of right-wing governments. Since we simultaneously expect 
that OLS results may be biased and that right-wing governments should be more heavily 
penalised than left-wing ones for tax increases, these results do provide some evidence for 
the effect of taxation on the vote30. The OLS results also show that neighbours’ tax 
increases have a statistically positive impact on votes for all types of governments, but 
that the impact is higher in the case of right-wing governments. The difference when 
estimating the equation by IV (column 4) is that the impact of the municipality’s own 
taxes on the vote is now also statistically significant, and that the interaction coefficients 
are higher than in the OLS case. The results regarding the impact of ideology are 
maintained when allowing for additional interactions. We should conclude that the results 
seem to confirm our hypothesis that left-wingers are less heavily punished for tax 
increases than right-wingers. For a 1% increase in the property tax rate, right-wingers lose 
9% of their vote share and left-wingers only 4.4%. In the case of neighbours’ tax 
increases, left-wingers are rewarded less (3.8%) than right-wingers (8.2%).The results 
therefore suggest that in the case of parties on the left, voters tend to use less (relative) tax 
increases as a key to judging the performance of the incumbent, and that this has more or 
less the same effect on the municipality’s own and on neighbours’ tax increases. 
The second and fifth columns of Table 4 add an interaction of the tax increase to the 
coalition dummy (COA). The results show that the coefficient of this interaction is 
negative and statistically significant in both the OLS and the IV cases, although the size 
of the coefficient is higher in the IV case. These results mean that the effect of a tax 
increase on the vote is stronger for coalitions than for majority governments. For a 1% 
increase in the property tax rate, majorities lose 4.4% of the vote, but coalitions lose 
8.9%. These results are not consistent with the ‘clarity of responsibility’ hypothesis that 
states that coalitions are held more accountable than majorities. There is no big surprise in 
confirming that this hypothesis does not hold. After all, many papers analysing economic 
                                                 
30 The endogeneity problem can be considered as as an omitted variable, showing an unmeasurable 
popularity shock of the incumbent. If tax increases and popularity are positively correlated, then the 
omission of popularity biases the OLS coefficient for the own tax increase towards zero. If we allow for a 
differential impact of tax increases on the vote, both coefficients (left and right) will be biased towards zero, 
but since the impact is much higher in one of the categories (right), we will still be able to find a statistically 
significant effect of taxes on the vote for this category (Stults and Winters, 2002). 
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voting in an international context rejected it, at least in its basic version (see for example 
Anderson, 2000, Nadeau et al., 2002). However, in the Spanish case coalitions are not 
only held less accountable than majorities but the vote losses of a coalition are also very 
high. It seems that voters have no major problems in assigning responsibility for taxation 
in the Spanish municipalities. When they encounter some uncertainty regarding which 
party is responsible for the tax increase they simply decide to punish all the members of 
the coalition. The fact that the punishment is so heavy may be explained by Spanish 
electors’ lack of confidence in government coalitions which often face collective action 
problems that make them be more profligate in passing new spending increases that 
benefit the various coalition partners. This lack of confidence in coalitions can be 
confirmed by the results of the COA dummy in the vote equation (see Table 2)31. Note 
that the coefficient is always negative and statistically significant. Controlling for all the 
other influences, a coalition always loses votes relative to a majority. Finally, note also 
that as in the case of ideology, these results also extend to the effect of neighbour’s tax 
increases, which generate a 3.8% increase in the vote for a majority, and a 7.2% increase 
in the vote of a coalition.  
The third and sixth columns of Table 4 add an interaction between the tax increase and 
the dummy indicating the government is in the first four-year term (NEW). The 
coefficient is positive but only statistically significant at the 90% level in the IV case. 
This means that we have found some evidence that governments are less heavily punished 
for tax increases during their first term. This may be due to the fact that first term 
governments have more credibility regarding the possible uses of these additional 
revenues. In subsequent terms of office, this confidence has been eroded. Voters no 
longer believe that their money will be used efficiently. Note also that neighbours tax 
increases have a lower impact on the vote in the case of new governments. 
Additional results. In order to check the robustness of our results, we re-estimate the 
vote equation (both in its basic version and with interactions) making some changes in the 
definition of the dependent variable and the tax increase. In order to save space, these 
                                                 
31 Although coalitions are the reflection of a highly pluralistic system, this benefit has to be weighted 
against their decision-making difficulties. Gridlock and collective action problems are not rare in municipal 
coalitions, and their consequences tend to be perceived as a problem by citizens. The increase in spending 
in Spanish municipalities due to lack of action, sometimes leading to more taxes and sometimes to deficit 
finance has been documented by different papers (see Solé-Ollé, 2003 and 2005). 
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results are not presented here but are only summarised. Firstly, we re-estimate the vote 
equation using the vote share of the party of the mayor (instead of the vote share of all the 
parties in the government). The basic results remain qualitatively unaltered. The 
municipality’s own tax increases reduce the vote for the mayor’s party by 5% (it should 
be recalled that this number was a 8.4% for all the parties), and neighbours’ tax increases 
increase the vote for the mayor by a 3.7% (6.2% beforehand). The results when political 
interactions are included are also more or less the same. The party of the mayor is also 
punished more when it is right-wing and when is a coalition, and less when is in its first 
term of office. Secondly, we re-estimate the vote equation, computing the tax increase 
during the two years preceding the election instead of using the full four-year period. The 
results are qualitatively the same, although the coefficients are higher. Now the parties in 
the government lose 11.5% of the vote when they raise the property tax rate, and gain 
7.5% of the vote when the tax rate is raised by their neighbours. We also estimated the 
vote equation simultaneously including the tax increase in the first two years of the term, 
and the tax increase in the last two years. The results suggest that  the municipality’s own 
(neighbours’) tax increases always have a negative (positive) impact on the vote, although 
the impact is much higher in the second part of the term. We can conclude, therefore, that 
the results presented in the paper are robust to these changes in the definition of the 
dependent variable and the tax increase. 
 
4. Conclusion 
We have tested whether or not increases in the property tax rate entail electoral costs for 
local governments. Results using a database of nearly 3,000 Spanish municipalities and 
analysing three local elections (1995, 1999 and 2003) suggest that these costs are 
statistically significant and not negligible. However, the electoral costs of tax increases 
are conditional on neighbours’ tax policy, since voters only seem to punish only tax 
increases that are bigger than the ones enacted in other municipalities. We interpret this 
result as evidence of ‘comparative voting behaviour’ and conclude, therefore, that the 
main necessary condition for ‘yardstick competition’ to arise is fulfilled in the Spanish 
case. These results complement those ones by Solé-Ollé (2003), which were for a small 
set of Spanish municipalities. In that paper, the author finds that municipalities tend to 
mimic the property and vehicle tax rates set in the neighbourhood. It would be interesting 
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to replicate the results obtained by Solé-Ollé (2003) with the very large database we use 
in this paper. This is not at present possible, since the database we use does not include 
many of the variables needed to estimate tax reaction functions accurately (e.g., 
intergovernmental transfers). This task is left for future work. 
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